Governor Walker’s move to implement pro-sprawl policies has been quick and wide spread.  Starting even before he took office, his opposition to the $800 million high-speed rail system cost the State of Wisconsin a service that would have benefited Milwaukee and Madison directly.  Quickly this was followed up with dramatic changes at the Department of Natural Resources .  It started with the appointment of Matt Maroney, the former Executive Director Metropolitan Builders Association of Greater Milwaukee, to the Deputy Secretary position, and was quickly followed up by the DNR announcing that it will be reducing air pollution, or rather the reporting of air pollution.

There’s more.  There was the passing of legislation that removed small wetlands from protection so that these wetlands could be developed, often enough into parking lots.   There is a proposed rule that would negatively impact  wind turbine siting, while opening the door for more sprawling development.  Every penny of funding for bike infrastructure was cut from the budget.  Another measure alters the tax impacts for pre-fab home construction, which will essentially have Wisconsin exporting sprawl to neighboring states.  Even the PACE program which would have protected our local food source, our farms, and slowed sprawl is to be eliminated.

The budget also dramatically speeds up freeway construction, while at the same time slashing local street funding and cutting transit. As predicted there will be a significant hit to transit systems statewide as there are deep funding cuts, the possibility of losing federal funds for some systems, a proposed dismantling of regional transit authorities, and the moving of transit funding out of the transportation fund into the general fund.  If this laundry list of agenda items shows anything, it is that there is a pro-sprawl agenda coming straight from the Governor’s office.

It’s unfortunate, because Wisconsin had been on track to be better prepared for our global future.  But it looks like as oil prices continue to rise, environmental impacts continue to pill up, and as the demands of the creative class go unanswered, Wisconsin will be unprepared and unwilling to move forward.

Milwaukee Intermodal Station Trainshed

Our belief that 2010 could have been the Year of the Park East, came up a bit short, and unfortunately it wasn’t the only project that was derailed in 2010.  The Rainier Properties II LLC’s office and movie theater proposal hasn’t budged.  The CommonBond project, an apartment proposal on RSC’s Park East land, failed to receive WHEDA tax credits so it stalled.  In fact nothing actually broke ground in the Park East, and most Park East proposals have gone quiet during this past year.

That said there were a couple of significant advances in the Park East.   First, The Moderne finally received financing, and although it has yet to officially break ground, site preparation started this past week. Secondly, The North End Phase II project received a funding agreement from WHEDA, though it is still working with the City of Milwaukee to complete the project’s financing.  Finally, MSOE proposed the building of a parking garage/athletic facility in the Park East which seems to be on the fast track.  So with an improving economy it looks possible that the Park East project will be able to get back on track in 2011.

Unfortunately, 2010 ended up being the year of high-speed rail, just not in Milwaukee.  Governor Walker ran a campaign that featured shutting down the high-speed rail upgrade and extension project as a key plank in his platform, and once elected he got his wish.  As a direct result the funds were reallocated from Wisconsin to a multitude of other states, costing Wisconsin, and Milwaukee in particular, jobs, tourism, and improved transportation options.  Legally required upgrades to the Milwaukee Intermodal Station are now delayed and possibly unfunded.  The funding for freight tracks that were to be upgraded to allow trains to travel at speeds higher than 10 MPH was also lost.  Finally, instead of 125 new central city jobs, Talgo will likely only keep 60 here in Milwaukee.

Clearly, 2010 wasn’t the year of the Park East, though certain projects did move forward, unfortunately for Milwaukee it turned out to be a year of anti-urban rhetoric that cost us much more than the pennies a year high-speed rail service would have cost Wisconsin.

Critics claim the goal is unrealistic and his jobs plan as lacking and juvenile. Walker counters this criticism with a little faith and some history. Wisconsin has bounced back before. In his victory speech he said that back in 1985, Wisconsin was facing “nearly identical circumstances,” losing nearly as many jobs then as now. Wisconsin was able to overcome the job losses with the election of Tommy Thompson, who governed over an increase of nearly 268,000 new jobs.

How accurate is this claim? And can we rely on Walker’s policies to get us there?

First, let’s look at the jobs data from 1980 through 2009. Wisconsin did indeed experience job losses in the early 1980s (about 71,000 jobs between 1980 and 1982). However, by 1985, Wisconsin recovered the lost jobs, surpassing the 1980 level. Similarly, Wisconsin’s unemployment rate increased from 7.3% in 1980 to 10.3% in 1982, but dropped to 7.2% in 1985.

In contrast, between 2007 and today, Wisconsin lost over 171,000 jobs and unemployment increased over 5% during the “Great Recession.”

Given the differences in the two recessions, Walker’s claim about “nearly identical circumstances” seems a little out of touch empirically. The economic tide began to turn in Wisconsin far before Tommy Thompson became governor. In fact, the bulk of Wisconsin’s economic recovery occurred during former Democratic Governor Tony Earl’s term.

So what about Walker’s goal of creating 250,000 jobs? Well, he’s right – Wisconsin did experience job expansion between 1986 and 1990. Over 267,700 new jobs were created during that period, and unemployment fell from 6.9% in 1986 to 4.3% in 1990.

What explains the increase in jobs? The Wisconsin Taxpayers Alliance offers a clue in their September report. They suggest that a significant expansion in the workforce, especially among working women, fueled the state’s job growth during that period. However, while Wisconsin experienced steady job expansion during Thompson’s terms in office, Wisconsin’s job growth still lagged behind the national average. Moreover, Thompson nearly tripled the amount of state spending during the 1990s (which I’ll return to in a little bit).

In his victory speech, Walker pointed to policies such as reducing (governmental) regulation, less litigation, and repealing the state’s law on health savings account to get us to the 250,000 jobs mark. In other forums he’s flirted with the idea of repealing the state’s tax on corporations. Can these usher in a new era of Wisconsin job growth?

Now, I can’t speak for most economists, but it’s important for readers to know that job creation doesn’t necessarily follow tax cuts per force. In fact, I’m constantly flustered at how this claim continues to seduce voters. See here for an example of how county tax cuts haven’t impacted the county unemployment level.

Job creation models are based on fancy statistical regressions that show how change in one factor can lead to change in the other – keeping every other variable constant. Specifically, tax cuts can lead to job growth only without changes in any other factors, such as state spending levels. With significant cuts in state spending levels, tax cuts will wash, and job creation won’t follow. In many cases, governmental spending is more important that tax rates in creating jobs (see here for an example of how government spending on roads leads to decreases in the unemployment level).

Overall, Walker’s optimism is somewhat grounded in reality (rebounds can happen!), although some important specifics are off.

I just hope that hope policymakers remember the lessons about the conditional impact of tax cuts and state spending. Significant cuts in education, health care, municipal services, and infrastructure can negatively impact job creation in the state – even if major tax cuts occur. If Walker really wants to follow in Tommy Thompson’s footsteps, then he’ll use strategic tax cuts without slashing services.

Related Article:

• Working on job creation

Guest post by: John Kovari

John Kovari is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the 2008-2009 Norman N. Gill Fellow at the Public Policy Forum. Additionally, he has served as a legislative assistant to city of Milwaukee Alderman Michael Murphy.

While Cullen, Krusick, and Staskunas aren’t responsible for the fiscal woes of MCTS (nor is MCTS itself), their support of AB282 could have saved a system that is headed for significant service cuts in 2011. A vote for a property tax for sales tax swap that Milwaukee County voters approved in 2008 would have been appreciated.

To show our frustration (and utter lack of graphic design skills), we’ve created a desktop wallpaper for you to display on your computer.

MCTS, Falling Off A Cliff

Politics are at work, given the election season.  Milwaukee County Executive Scott Walker blames the economy and is downplaying his decision to raise fares over the past several years, and transit advocates are saying that the drop is due to large fare increases and service cuts (fewer routes).

It’s a finger-pointing situation I really hate, so I decided to go straight to the data, presented for you here to make up your own mind.

First, here’s data associated with Walker’s argument: that the declining economy explains the downturn in ridership.

Stats geeks will want to know that the correlation is indeed significant and negative. But taking a closer look at the data makes me wonder if unemployment really drives less ridership. Take a closer look at the graph. There’s a pesky outlier on the bottom right hand side of the graph. That’s the 8.5% unemployment rate in 2009, and it’s most likely skewing the correlation.

Translation: while there might be a relationship, Walker’s overemphasizing the impact of the economy on bus ridership. More on this point later in the post…

Next, take a look at the relationship between fare prices and ridership. Here, we’re testing the assertion that fare increases and service cuts lead to drops in ridership.

As evident from the graph, the relationship between fares and ridership is significant and negative. That is, as fares go up, less people decide to ride.

While both the economy and fares have a statistically significant relationship with how many people decide to ride the bus (even in the regression models I ran), if I had to bet on either I’d bet on fares as the major factor in play here.

Why fares? It’s because when you look at the historical data, there’s a massive spike in ridership in 1979 and 1980 (see graph below).

Remember in 1979 the Iranian Revolution led to an energy crisis and recession – high gas prices, long lines at gas stations, cats and dogs living together, etc. If Walker’s argument is correct, then bus ridership in 1979-80 should have dropped precipitously. Instead, during hard times, people turned to public transportation.

Today, during hard times, people might be using transit more if County government reduced fares.

Of course, this doesn’t mean we should slash prices either. If we look again at the graph with fare prices (the middle graph), it shows that there is an ideal price at which to charge riders, around $0.75-$1 (the point at which ridership peaked). In theory, this price should maximize ridership, and bring in additional revenue to the transit system to cover costs.

Bottom line: Walker has evidence to back up his bad economy claim, but he shouldn’t be ignoring the fact that fare prices have a more important relationship with ridership totals. In other words, Walker’s budgeting decisions have led to less ridership.

Guest post by: John Kovari

John Kovari is a Ph.D. student in political science at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the 2008-2009 Norman N. Gill Fellow at the Public Policy Forum.  Additionally, he has served as a legislative assistant to city of Milwaukee Alderman Michael Murphy.

It is possible that the race could come down to Barrett versus Walker, and because of this the potential impacts on Milwaukee are significant.  If this happens the Milwaukee area is guaranteed to have one top level position albeit the Mayor’s office, or County Executive become vacated.  Clearly, the impacts of either of Barrett or Walker winning have dramatically different outcomes for Milwaukee.

Politically, the policies are well known, it’s clear that Walker would attempt to hold taxes down at almost any cost, likely pushing again for passing TABOR, and as experienced by residents of Milwaukee County by cutting services or in some cases neglecting services.  Holding taxes down is a commendable goal, unless it negatively impacts vital Milwaukee area services such as mass transit, the Milwaukee Public School System, and parks.  Finally, Walker has consistently opposed any sort of fixed rail system, and as he has in the past work in opposition to the KRM project and Milwaukee’s downtown streetcar.

Obviously, Barrett would bring and different set of policies to Madison, a set that would be open to expanding mass transit and building fixed rail, but a set that would in all likelihood raise taxes to cover the increasing cost of services.  Recently, Mayor Barrett showed his support for fixed rail by successfully lobbying Washington to split the $91.5 million worth of federal funds which had been designated to Milwaukee for the purpose of improving mass transit back in the 90′s, so that the money can finally be spent on developing a Milwaukee streetcar system.  On the taxes front property taxes have grown under Mayor Barrett’s helm, though not terribly fast, and fees have certainly risen.  Prior to the market crash the budgets had generally been tight but raising fees, and cutting staff had been the Barrett’s method of slowing the rate of increase in property taxes.

Clearly, rising taxes, and the importance of mass transit are two vital issues that could dramatically impact the future of Milwaukee.  But at the local level it’s far more interesting to speculate at the potential cast of characters that could attempt to replace either Mayor Barrett or County Executive Walker.

For the Mayors Office if Barrett were to win the Gubernatorial race.

• Former Alderman Michael D’Amato.  Recently former Alderman D’Amato has rounded out his resume by becoming involved in education efforts, and the M7 economic development initiative.  At one time he had flirted with running for Milwaukee County Executive, but choose to pass, this might be a better opportunity for his return to politics.
• Alderman Robert Bauman.  Alderman Bauman regularly takes an active role in citywide issues, such as mass transit, as such he might consider entering the race.
• Common Council President Willie Hines.  Council President Hines has broad appeal, and is often considered as a possible candidate, this could be his shot.
• Alderman Donovan.  Alderman Donovan is always working to be in the news, putting out a press release, holding a press conference, or taking a shot at Mayor Barrett, so it certainly appears as though he’d be interested in the office.
• Rep Pedro Colon. (D)  Despite his failure to win the race for Milwaukee City Attorney against incumbent Grant Langley, he may still have aspirations for City Hall.
• U.S. Rep Gwen Moore (D).  It wouldn’t be the first time a U.S. Rep from Milwaukee ran for Mayor, and it might be seen as a stepping stone to even higher office.

For County Executive if Walker were to win the Gubernatorial race.

• Milwaukee County Parks Director Sue Black.  Parks Director Black has done an fantastic job running the Milwaukee County Park System in the face of budget cuts and staff reductions.  She has consider running in the past, but the prospect of running against your boss probably ended any serious consideration.  With Walker out of the way she may consider it again.
• Sheriff David Clarke (I).  Despite continually running as an Independent Democrat, he is still popular among conservatives, and has always appeared interested in a political office.
• Rep. Jon Richards (D).  He has considered running for County Executive in the past, and with Walker out of the way this door might finally be open.
• Rep. Jeff Stone (R). Stone has experience managing his own business, has reached across the aisle on issues like transit lending his support to the RTA. His name is almost always mentioned when it comes to County Executive in the post-Walker era.
• Supervisor John Weishan Jr.  Supervisor Weishan is often in the middle of big issue and debates, not always winning them, but in the fight regardless.
• Supervisor Chris Larson.  As a freshman Supervisor this may be a long shot, but an opening like this don’t come along all too often and Supervisor Larson might have to consider running.
• Joe Klein (I).  Klein is an extremely long and quite frankly a silly shot, but he’s likely to run as he has twice before.

Who did we miss?

In summary, in order to pay for the massive pension funding gap caused by the first scandal, and lately the market’s performance, the county needs a lot of money.  To get that money they’ve issued $400 million in bonds since the start of 2009.  With the proceeds from the issuance of those 6% bonds, they’ll invest in the market at a hope of earning an 8% return.  They’ll then use the excess 2% they hope to earn to pay for the pension liabilities.  That amount of profit as planned is $237 million.

Seems like a good plan, until you consider what happens if things go wrong.  Assuming the stock market performs only at the rate of interest on the bonds, the county will have undertaken a large risk for zero reward.  More catastrophic though, would be for the market to under-perform the interest rate on the bonds.  Milwaukee County will then find itself in a far worse financial situation, with likely no ability to short-term borrow their way out of it.  The county has to do something, but borrowing-and-investing appears to be quite aggressive.

When a plan like this comes around, it’s best to ask yourself the question “if it really is this easy wouldn’t everyone be doing it?” Instead of discussing closing libraries, privatizing the Water Works, and having fewer firefighters per crew, why doesn’t the City of Milwaukee get the free cash it so desperately needs for its $90 million budget hole with pension bonds and investments?  Why don’t we see this as common place for local governments?  Why am I not doing it?

The answer is because it’s extremely risky.

Of course something that looks great on paper, but has a lot of long-term risk is just what a politician can feed on.  County Executive Walker is more than happy to look at this as a fix as he runs for Governor and looks to leave Milwaukee County with its troubles behind.  The Milwaukee County Board seems posed to go along, perhaps because it avoids drastic cuts that will be difficult to stomach (and get re-elected on).

The costs from the pension scandal haven’t gone away, and in a year where budgets are bad for every level of government dependant on property taxes, things are real bad for the county. While calls have gone out to dissolve the Milwaukee County government and eliminate the County Executive position, they seem far-fetched.  It’s time though to start small and have serious discussions about off-loading aspects of Milwaukee County to other units of government, existing or new, privitazed or not.  Consolidating services with the City of Milwaukee may provide cost savings for both departments, especially in the areas of information technology.  Any proposal from privitazing the airport to creating a regional transit authority should be investigated thoroughly with the hopes of putting Milwaukee County in a better long-term fiscal position.

The move, which many see as a slam of Milwaukee by Doyle, arguably shouldn’t be completely viewed that way.  Doyle did propose a three-county sales tax of up to 0.5% for Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha Counties to establish an authority that would operate all of the transit in the area including the KRM.  Doyle’s reasoning for the veto was that the MTA didn’t have a regional approach.

Some have speculated that this was done as part of Doyle’s potential re-election bid.  That it was an attempt to position himself against Milwaukee County Executive Scott Walker.  I don’t buy that, Doyle had proposed the sales tax in his budget previously, and he wouldn’t have allowed the KRM to continue to move forward because, Walker will surely run all over rural Wisconsin talking about “Doyle’s choo choo,” sales tax or no sales tax.  If Doyle was that desperate to position himself against Walker, he would have vetoed the KRM as well.  I can’t speak for Doyle, but I think this was a clear statement to southeastern Wisconsin to get its act in order and come up with a functional, regional solution.

So what’s next? Something has to happen as the 2010 MCTS funding crisis is quickly approaching.  The word on the street is that Doyle is pushing the legislature for a real regional sales tax for Kenosha, Racine, and Milwaukee Counties to be introduced as its own legislation.

Now is the time for the Milwaukee caucus to actually deliver for their constituents and get this done.  We’ve watched Lena Taylor and Pedro Colon settle on the Joint Finance Committee for a compromise that gave Racine and Kenosha a free ride as a way to protect Racine Senator John Lehman, but now is the time for real action, real solutions.  Because with the funding crisis looming, and Scott Walker probably willing to cut off his own arm to avoid raising taxes, it’s now or never time.

Unfortunately, what is the Milwaukee caucus doing right now?  Pouting.  Taylor, Colon, and Grigsby led the charge on the Joint Finance Committee to vote down a small spending allotment of $35,000 to further study the KRM.

Even worse, Milwaukee County Board Chair, Lee Holloway has given a series of statements which sound more like a whining teenager, than someone who is determined to leverage his friends in the legislature to go out and get a real funding solution for a real crisis.

Meanwhile, Holloway said he would work against the KRM line by appointing himself and an ally to the transit authority board.

“We are going to vote against the KRM, right down the line,” Holloway said.

“It’s just terrible,” Holloway said. “I’m very critical of (Doyle). I thought he was a friend of Milwaukee County.”

It’s time for our Milwaukee caucus to bring home a real dedicated funding solution for transit in southeastern Wisconsin.

The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel has an excellent series of short articles on the case, the players, and the history that educate you with everything you need to get started.

Timeline

1991 – Milwaukee awarded $289 million for the construction of a dedicated-bus lane in the East-West Freeway corridor (Interstate 94 from Downtown to Waukesha).  When the plan was canceled, the federal government took back $48 million.

1998 – Jim Rowen at The Political Environment has the best summary…

Then Gov. Tommy Thompson prevailed on Rep. Tom Petri (R) to allow Thompson to direct the transit funds to other transportation projects, including freeways, because Thompson wanted the money for the Marquette Interchange reconstruction. Intervention by then-Rep. Tom Barrett (D), and Sen. Herb Kohl, (D), prevented that outcome – - and I don’t recall then State Rep. Scott Walker, (R), piping up and complaining that would mean less money for Milwaukee County buses someday.

1999 – A deal between County Executive Tom Ament, Mayor John Norquist, and Governor Tommy Thompson and approved by the federal government diverts $149.5 million to a series projects that include the construction of the new Marquette Interchange, the 6th Street Viaduct, and Canal Street.  The fund (which does not gain interest) is left with $91.5 million designed for capital costs of a downtown circulator starter system.  To access the remaining funds, approval is needed from the Milwaukee Mayor, the Milwaukee County Executive, the President of the MMAC, and the CEO of the Wisconsin Center District (WCD).

2006 – The Milwaukee Common Council approves an electric-guided bus plan, backed by the MMAC and WCD, intending to move it into preliminary engineering.  Mayor Tom Barrett vetos the $300 million proposal, the majority of the Common Council reverses their previous position and upholds the veto.  Plan killed.  Credit the Common Council for trying to do something on the issue, but the system was seriously flawed and I think that was realized at the end of the day.

2007-2008 – Tom Barrett and Scott Walker each pushed the issue of the $91.5 much more publicly.  Barrett unveiled a plan that included a downtown streetcar loop and two express bus lines, and talked of reconfiguring existing bus service to work with new, express service.  Walker unveiled an express bus plan scant on details, but complete with attacks on the Mayor’s plan.  It appeared he had the intention to simply cut all standard bus service in the areas to be served by express buses.  Both, being career politicians, cleverly avoided any mention of the money needed to operate such a system after building it.

September 9th, 2008 – Tom Barrett and Scott Walker debate the merits of their respective proposals at a forum at Marquette moderated by Mike Gousha.  Barrett offers to split the $91.5 million 50/50 in person to Walker (an idea he had been proposing for weeks if not months prior), Walker refuses.

March 2009 – Senator Herb Kohl and Representative David Obey include an earmark provision in the bill that became the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 that divided the $91.5 million between the City of Milwaukee and Milwaukee County.  Milwaukee County received 40% ($36.6 million), with the City of Milwaukee receiving 60% ($54.9 million).  Barrett and Walker are each now free to pursue using their respective allocated funds to build a new mode of transit service in Milwaukee.

More details on the origin of the money, and past issues is available in an article on Milwaukee transit politics.

FAQ

Is the streetcar proposal part of the proposed Regional Transit Authority (RTA)?

No, but in the future it could become part of the RTA.  At this time no serious discussions have taken place between the City of Milwaukee and appointed-members of the RTA (outside of of course the Mayor’s appointee Sharon Robinson).  The RTA is currently being debated in the Wisconsin State Senate and State Assembly after being included in the Governor’s budget proposal.  It would allow the counties of Kenosha, Racine, and Milwaukee to enact a sales tax up to 0.5% to fund transit services (key aspect: it would not enact the sales tax as further action would be needed locally in each county).

Does that streetcar affect the current transit funding crisis?

No, the $91.5 million is not available for operating costs of MCTS.  Nor, despite what Scott Walker advocates, does the implementation of a streetcar compete for funding against the existing transit system.  The key to fixing the existing transit funding crisis is to obtain dedicated funding.  Currently property tax dollars from the general fund of Milwaukee County are used.  These are supplemented by dollars from the state.  When this is not enough (as it not been numerous years in a row) federal dollars designated for capital expenses (new buses) have been used for operating expenses.  This problem has been looming for years, and has been postponed with service cuts and fare hikes.

Does the streetcar stand a better chance of being built with the RTA in place?

Yes.  The RTA would provide a dedicated funding source for transit in Kenosha, Racine, and Milwaukee counties.  It could also serve as the operator of multiple services in place of MCTS and other existing services, this included the KRM commuter rail line and potentially the streetcar.  The streetcar proposal currently has the majority of the funding needed for construction (capital costs), but not for the operating budget.  The RTA is a logical fit for operation of the streetcar, especially since the proposed route would sync with the RTA-proposed KRM commuter rail line at the Milwaukee Intermodal Station.  The RTA is likewise a good choice for the operator of the region’s bus transit services as centralized branding, route planning, and uniform ticketing will lead to the attractive and cost-effective intermodal transit system.

Where would the streetcar run?

On steel rails embedded in the road in the same lane as traffic runs on.  The rails would not damage cars or cause a bumpy driving experience.  Unfortunately for road bikers, narrow tires may get stuck in the space between the rail and the road, but there isn’t a shortage of streets in downtown Milwaukee that bikers can utilize.  Portland, perhaps the most bike friendly city in America, has avoided this problem by dedicating space for bike lanes or having bike lanes intersect streetcar tracks perpendicularly.  The streetcar would also have signal priority, so it won’t get stuck at stop lights.  An example image from Portland is included below.

Would the streetcar eliminate street parking where it runs?

Rarely.  Depending on the configuration of the street and the location of the stops minimal parking would be lost.  Using the same space for stops as the existing buses do would save stalls (and make logical transferring points) will reduce the need to eliminate parking. Additionally, using streets that don’t have much street parking on them to start (such as Van Buren Street south of Juneau) will make the loss of parking minimal.  An example image of how a streetcar stop may function is included below, remember that the spot is already “unparkable” as it is a bus stop.

What’s the difference between a streetcar system and a light rail system?

There is a three-fold difference between streetcars and light rail.  The first is the intended users, streetcars work within a handful of densely populated neighborhoods circulating people (light rail connects location at least a couple miles apart (downtown to the airport, UWM, or Miller Park, with maybe one stop inbetween each).  The second difference is the type of track such a system would need, to go longer distances a light rail system a dedicated right-of-way is needed where no other vehicles can run.  Longer travel distances also yields itself to bigger and longer trains, bigger trains mean bigger stations.  Streetcars, as their name, indicates run in the street, with traffic and are much shorter (and smaller) than light rail vehicles.  The third difference is the cost.  Light rail costs more, at least $10 million more per mile, Tucson, AZ estimates light rail would cost $30 million more per mile than a streetcar (numbers will vary based on size of system, need for land acquisition, and road configuration).  At the end of the day it’s an apples-to-oranges comparison though as they serve different purposes.

More discussion on this issue can be found in a previous article on transit technologies.

Why not a bus instead of a streetcar?

Quality of the ride, and the chance of sparking investment.  Riding on steel rails provides a very smooth ride, on top of having curb bump-outs at stops so there isn’t weaving in and out of traffic, and signal priority to avoid waiting at stop lights.  Second, investing in the steel rails in the ground has a great chance of sparking development nearby as has been shown in numerous other cities where modern streetcar systems have been built.  It’s a show of confidence that a bus can’t deliver.  There is also an unfortunate reality that there is a stigma attached to standard bus service, and that people will ride the streetcar that would rarely, if ever, ride a standard bus.

No one would ride the streetcar

False.  The 78,000 or so people that work downtown along with the 15,000 that live downtown are likely riders.  That’s before entertainment is considered, to which the streetcar would enable people to avoid paying for parking next to the Bradley Center or other venues and park in other areas of downtown.  It would be a boost to downtown businesses, as it would encourage people to move about the area after parking.  Current MCTS riders would also have their ability to move about the downtown extended, which might allow some to take a bus downtown and the streetcar to their ultimate destination (or save someone currently taking a long walk).  Riders of the future KRM commuter rail line will be able to get off at the station and ride the streetcar to their ultimate destination.  The last and final obvious group of potential riders is tourists, who stay at all the various hotels around downtown or drive into downtown to the convention center and currently don’t go elsewhere in the city.

Why Only 3 Miles In Length?

Money, money and politics.  The federal money was donated to create a starter system.  At a cost between $18-$30 million per mile, three miles would keep the cost below $100 million and provide a starter system with obvious routes to UWM, the west, and the airport as potential future extensions.

Looking at various routes, also yields the reality that three miles is about as short as one can go before the system doesn’t connect anything.  It won’t be easy for the city to obtain the remaining money to build the system, but it won’t be impossible either.  To put it in perspective, the final cost of Miller Park is four times that of the streetcar proposal.  Still, it’s a lot to swallow politically, so as Barrett says “it’s the goldie locks plans, not too big, not too small, just right.”  If you disagree, run for Mayor or County Executive, just don’t be surprised when you get laughed out of the room.

Who is going to pay for the rest of the capital costs?

The portion the city received for the streetcar from the $91.5 million was $54.9 million, which is a significant amount, but not enough to cover the costs of Tom Barrett’s proposal.  That leaves options to fund the remainder.  The likely funding option is that the city bonds the money to build it, and it is paid back through the general property tax fund.

Another possiblity is that a benefactor or two could fund the system. Michael Cudahy has been an outspoken advocate of a streetcar system, flying Walker and Barrett around the country (and to Ireland) to look at different systems.  He had mentioned funding the capital costs for his own route, so there is an outside chance Barrett could convince him to fund some portion of the ultimate route.

Using the RTA’s potential bonding ability (as derived from its sales tax collections) is extremely unlikely, but is technically a possibility.

Theoretically one could also put together a series of tax-incremental financing districts to pay for the capital costs, but that would hamper the city’s ability to collect the increased property tax revenue that the line would generate through transit-oriented development.

Winning Route of the Urban Milwaukee Streetcar Contest

We held a contest seeking out the best possible three-mile streetcar route, and a clear winner emerged.  We’ve included that route below as the Mayor’s route isn’t final until there are rails in the ground.

View Transit Idea A in a larger map

This area was previously served by Route 11 until March of 2008 when fares were raised to $2.00 and a number of lines were cut.  The route may actually see a continual rise in ridership as it connects The Brewery (the Pabst Brewery redevelopment) with downtown, where more and more buildings are being restored and occupied.

The new route has been labeled “Route 33 – Vliet Street“, and has been running since March 29th.

Service frequency won’t be amazing on the new route, with buses every 25 minutes on the weekdays and 30 minutes on the weekends.  Having some level of service is so much better than having no service at all though.

Cheers to the County Board for overriding the veto, and kudos to MCTS for making it work.

I’ve created a Google Map for you to interact with the new route.  MCTS has their standard static map as well.

View Route 33 in a larger map

So the question is, why isn’t Milwaukee County on the initial list?

I know it’s early and I’m sure money will eventually flow to fix the state highways that run through Milwaukee County, but to be left out of the initial programs while Sawyer County with a population of about 16,000 will get $3.2 million in funding indicates our priorities are wrong. Don’t get me wrong, I understand that there is an additional $250 million to be allocated and clearly Milwaukee County will get its share but the question remains why isn’t Milwaukee County on the initial list, as it is likely the county with the most immediate needs.

Is it possible this delay is because Milwaukee County Executive Scott Walker is sticking to his ideology and refusing to request money for state highway projects in Milwaukee County? Or is the delay connected to the long running friction between Madison and Milwaukee? Hopefully these questions will answered and Milwaukee County will soon get its fair share, so that Milwaukee can rebuild and put its citizens back to work.